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In this thesis, I explore what accounts for worker consent to precarious employment in 
the context of rapid industrial change in the rural United States. In recent years, domestic 
oil development has transformed the landscape of western North Dakota and Eastern 
Montana into a zone of oil production now known as “the Bakken.” The acute demand 
for labor brought about by this development resulted in vastly inflated wages, which in 
turn drew workers from around the U.S. and the world. State and private labor market 
intermediaries, including temporary labor agencies, formed to organize and market this 
labor force for employers in the area. Just as global demand for oil flagged in late 
summer of 2015, I completed six weeks of participant observation as a temporary laborer 
in the Bakken. Using the observational data I collected during my fieldwork, I examine 
how a private temporary labor agency organized and redistributed the labor force still 
present in the Bakken, as well as how workers themselves participated in and resisted the 
commodification of their labor. I find that the interplay of worker aspirations for class 
mobility, the removal of the labor process from worker-employer negotiations, and the 
inability of migrant workers to invest in the local community account for consent to this 
precarious organization of labor, and present major obstacles to worker mobilization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The history of the American west could be described in terms of commodities and 
labor—agricultural land and dry land farming, copper and mining, even housing credit and 
construction (Hostetter 2011). Population “booms,” often associated with resource 
extraction and the labor it requires, have been major engines of demographic change west 
of the Mississippi since European colonization. The remnants of mining towns, oil booms, 
coal strips and suburban sprawl across the western landscape memorialize these rapid 
shifts in population. Many of the settlements of the rural west that remain are less the 
vectors of demographic growth we usually imagine and more decaying fragments of 
previous booms. Such was the case on the banks of the Missouri River near the Montana-
North Dakota border.  
 White colonists first settled the two major towns on either side of the border—
Sidney, Montana, and Williston, North Dakota—in the 1870s and 1880s (Works Progress 
Administration 1938, Mercier 1985). Since then, periodic, rapid population growth has 
concurred with crises in global capital and technological innovation. In 1900, homesteaders 
arrived to dry land farm the area. In the 1930s, flood irrigation technology and global 
depression brought another infusion of migrants seeking refuge from the dust bowl and the 
automation of agriculture. The first oil boom occurred In the 1950s. The oil crisis of the 
1980s and another surge in domestic oil production brought about the region’s final period 
of intense growth in the century. After the boom of the early to mid 1980s subsided, the 
region experienced a decades-long contraction of the populations that swelled there 
periodically the previous hundred years.  
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 By 2008, another period of acute immigration associated with speculation and 
resource development (a “boom”) was in full swing. Features from past booms 
accompanied this one, albeit at an unprecedented scale. Once again, a systemic crisis in the 
global economy and novel production technologies brought investment and workers from 
around the world, yet this boom differed in ways that represent broader social and 
economic shifts since the 1980s. The fact that this boom happened in the midst of a great 
recession and found its productive medium in hydraulic fracturing technologies (vs. flood 
irrigation or conventional drilling) have important consequences that I cannot fully 
examine here. In this thesis, I make sense of another novelty for resource development in 
the area, one that has become emblematic of 21st century work practices in general: 
temporary labor. 
 Temporary labor needs to be understood as a site where the politics of “market 
fundamentalism” (Somers and Block 2014) are negotiated in the daily practices of the men 
and women who become temporary workers. Understanding these practices requires an 
investigation of temporary work as a lived experience. To this end, I conducted over 90 
hours of participant observation in a temporary labor agency and on jobsites in Williston, 
North Dakota.  
The people I lived and worked with during those six weeks were experiencing the 
effects of a dramatic decline in the barrel price of oil in a “flexible” economy. Oil had gone 
from nearly $100 a barrel in June of 2014 to less than $50 by February of 2015. For 
corporations, this meant consolidation and contraction as many smaller operations 
succumbed to increasingly adverse conditions in the global commodities market. For many 
young workers in the region, it meant the loss of the overtime wages, benefits, and dignity 
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oil work had provided. The collapse of oil prices represented a loss of a sense of financial 
security that has become increasingly rare for a generation of the American working class 
raised in the neoliberal era.  
Many of the men I met in the Bakken were willing to trade the service industry jobs 
they had in cities for work that, while more precarious, seemed to approximate the 
legendary status of manual labor during westward expansion. The former oil workers I met 
at the temp agency were loath to return to jobs serving pizza or cooking on lines, where it 
was impossible to work like a bread-winning man is supposed to, in their view: as an 
integral unit of the global economy. Even as these men’s labor was redistributed (via the 
temp agency) from oil to housing and road construction projects, they were still holding 
out for the boom’s return—analyzing economic indicators, talking about trends in the price 
of gasoline, applying for jobs through the Williston Job Service, and picking apart political 
developments such as the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran. When I asked them about 
the future of oil development in the Bakken, they speculated about  “professional 
politicians” in the federal government and corporate elites distorting what they assumed 
was the natural rhythm of market processes. In short, they wanted to be “free” to sell their 
labor for the highest wage possible.  
 In this thesis, I explore what accounts for these men’s choice to work and live in a 
boomtown even as it began to bust. Using the observational data I collected during my 
fieldwork, I examine the ways in which the Temporary Labor Company (TLC) organized the 
labor force still present in the Bakken, as well as how workers themselves responded to the 
commodification of their labor. I find that the interplay of an oil boom ideology, the 
removal of the labor process from worker-employer negotiations, and worker tactics both 
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within and outside the labor process explain their continued participation in a collapsing 
labor market.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To help explain and describe temporary work in the Bakken, I appealed to three 
distinct research traditions: Social Impact Analysis (SIA) or boomtown studies, Political 
Ecology, and the sociology of work. In the paragraphs below, I summarize the contributions 
of SIA/boomtown studies and articulate a critique of the field. I go on to suggest that a 
synthesis of Political Ecology’s emphasis on scale, livelihoods, and micropolitics and the 
sociology of work’s understanding of precarity and the labor process offers a perspective 
on resource booms well suited to the political, economic, and social conditions of 21st 
century boomtowns. While temporary labor is representative of these conditions, it 
remains unstudied in the context of resource extraction.  
 
 Boomtown Studies 
Boomtown studies are the most influential Sociological treatments of energy 
development in the United States’ rural west. Founders of the field categorize it variously 
as community sociology, rural sociology and the sociology of energy (e.g. Rosa 1988, Gold 
1985, Albrecht et al. 1983). Its most notable contributor, William Freudenburg, went on to 
become an influential environmental sociologist (Dunlap 2013). Despite their disciplinary 
breadth, these social scientific studies of boomtowns share a common progenitor: Social 
Impact Analysis (SIA) (Albrecht et al. 1983). 
 5 
SIA was a response to the energy booms and increasing environmental 
consciousness emerging in the American west from the 1970s to the mid 1980s (Albrecht 
et al. 1983, Vanclay 2006). The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1970 
included society and social conditions in its definition of environment. As a result, the 
federal government required consideration of both social and environmental impacts in 
development projects. Specifically, social scientists were called upon to evaluate the 
consequences of resource development on social, economic and cultural life. 
The scholars responsible for these early technical reports published academic 
interpretations of their SIA data in the form of boomtown studies. These studies have, in 
turn, largely framed the questions, scope and methodological approaches of contemporary 
boomtown studies within and outside the United States (e.g. Lawrie et al. 2011, Halseth 
1999, Weber et al. 2014). While the first generation of boomtown studies offer key 
empirical and theoretical background for this thesis, they also impose epistemological 
blind spots I highlight here before employing contributions from Political Ecology and the 
sociology of work.  
 The underlying motivation of many early SIAs and boomtown studies was to make a 
case for including social and cultural considerations in industrial development. Raymond 
Gold’s 1985 ethnography of the construction of coal-fired power plants in Colstrip, 
Montana, highlights what Vanclay (2006) calls the “proponent-adversary approach” typical 
of early SIA. Gold attributes residents’ “increasing sense of vulnerability” to public and 
private agencies giving “relatively little weight to the locals’ sociocultural concerns 
compared to…the technological and economic ones of the corporation and its customers” 
(Gold 1985:50). Early SIA’s greatest contribution is the rigorous argument it made for 
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balancing environmental and economic concerns with sociological insight when assessing 
the impact of resource development.  
 Arguably the most widely-cited boomtown scholar from the 1970s and 1980s is 
William Freudenburg. In landmark studies, Freudenburg demonstrated that boomtown 
conditions in northern Colorado result in increased mental health caseloads for mental 
healthcare providers (Freudenburg 1982), increased levels of alienation among 
adolescents (Freudenburg 1984), and a diminished “density of acquaintanceship” 
(Freudenburg 1986). Freudenburg’s work indicates that the social impacts of rapid 
population growth on community cohesion and long-term stability are difficult to detect in 
official economic or crime statistics. Exhaustive secondary data analysis or tailored survey 
instruments need be employed, he argued, in order to quantify how boomtown conditions 
affect residents. Further, social change impacts are expressed differently among different 
local populations.  
 Raymond Gold, who strenuously advocated ethnographic field methods, was one of 
the few SIA scholars to define social impacts from the point of view of local residents (both 
“newcomers” and “long-timers,” in his terms), rather than preconceived social scientific 
indicators. This is, at least in part, a product of his qualitative methodological preference—
a rarity in SIA. Gold (1985) found that the introduction of non-local, impermanent 
residents have the effect of enclosing extant social circles in residential communities, 
creating enclaves of “locals” amidst a “growing proportion of newcomers” in the 
community (Gold 1985: 68). Social islands of long-timers, in turn, tended to heighten long-
term divisions and balkanize local resistance to change—for better or worse.  
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 Summers and Branch (1984), in an article that closely aligns with the sociology of 
work and Political Ecology traditions summarized below, discuss the key economic effects 
of industrial development and resource extraction. They demonstrate that while economic 
benefits can accrue for communities under certain conditions, they are almost always 
distributed unevenly throughout the community (pp 140-156). Further, they found that 
large-scale industrial construction or resource extraction projects rarely employ locals in 
high-wage technical positions. Instead, project coordinators house technical workers 
temporarily on-site or have them commute long distances (pg 149). Importantly, Summers 
and Branch locate resource booms in the context of broader political economic changes: 
The growth of boomtowns and plant shutdowns are predictable 
consequences of capital mobility; both cases are accompanied by hardships 
for some workers and communities. There is an underlying tension between 
the free movement of capital, on the one hand, and community stability and 
worker welfare, on the other. (1984: 159) 
 
Summers and Branch’s analysis, then, suggests a linkage between the concepts of flexible 
accumulation and boomtown studies. The “tension” they describe between free market 
principles and worker welfare in resource booms is central to this analysis.  
 Boomtown studies: an international critique 
 SIA and boomtown studies had its heyday in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 
1990s, a lull in domestic resource development caused many scholars in the U.S. to turn 
their attentions elsewhere. Simultaneously, the predominance of “market-oriented 
solutions and top-down, instrumental global governance” to development problems 
resulted in an emphasis on economic and environmental impact statements (Scoones 2009: 
6).  
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 As SIA declined in the U.S., it found a receptive audience internationally, where the 
practice was taken up and modified to suit different environmental, intellectual and social 
contexts. International practitioners and scholars developed their own version of SIA 
through systematic critique.  
 Frank Vanclay, an Australian advocate for and practitioner of SIA, summarizes the 
international discussion of SIA as practiced in the U.S. (Vanclay 2002, 2006). Vanclay 
suggests the epistemological orientation of SIA leads to a flawed theoretical structure of 
impact variables. Echoing a critique articulated by Gold in early debates on social impacts 
(Albrecht et al. 1983), Vanclay explains that SIA-defined “impact variables” rarely measure 
impacts directly. Instead, he argues, crime rates, the presence of sexual “predators” (cf. 
Berger and Beckmann 2010), and other statistics are indicators that impacts may exist, 
given the right social conditions (Vanclay 2002:188)—just as a thrown rock will shatter ice 
but ripple water. For instance, the “influx or outflow of workers” (Guidelines and Principles 
1993:19) might differentially impact a community, depending on (for example) the 
number, composition, relative difference between non-resident workers and pre-boom 
residents, and presence of a “work hard, play hard” mindset among non-resident workers 
(Vanclay 2002:194). In the words of Raymond Gold, a focus on quantifiable variables in the 
absence of ethnographic fieldwork can result in a study of the “indices of human behavior 
rather than the actual behavior itself” (Gold, in Albrecht et al. 1983:353). 
 The value of this body of boomtown literature is in articulating some of the social 
impacts of resource development. My inquiry into work in the Bakken draws heavily on 
aspects of the boomtown tradition: Freudenburg’s work on mental health impacts, Gold’s 
iconoclastic ethnographic approach, and Summers and Branch’s political-economic survey. 
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However, as Vanclay’s critique suggests, SIA is inadequate for investigations that seek to 
understand the symbolic struggles for meaning associated with resource development 
(Moore 1993). To compensate for this, I employ findings from the sociology of work and 
Political Ecology, fields that provide well-developed, empirically-driven definitions of work, 
industrial change, and natural resource development.  
 
Political Ecology 
  Where boomtown studies emerged out of the study of 20th century resource 
development in the United States, Political Ecology explored resource development in non-
Western contexts. Early works such as Piers Blaikie’s The Political Economy of Soil Erosion 
in Developing Countries (1985) examined resource exploitation on multiple political and 
economic scales. Similar to the SIA scholars who advocated for sociological inquiry in 
resource development, Blaikie and other early Political Ecologists sought to explain “the 
integration of social factors” in analyses of environmental problems (Blaikie 1985:81). In 
contrast to SIA, applying a multiscalar political-economic approach allowed Blaikie and 
others to explain problems such as soil erosion in Africa as the result of a global system of 
inequality, rather than the product of local resource mismanagement and/or 
overpopulation.  
 While Political Ecologists employ a wide range of methodological styles, they share 
an emphasis on “empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the condition 
and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations of 
power” (Robbins 2004:391). Moore (1993) stresses that these changing 
social/environmental systems are shaped by both “micropolitics” and “symbolic 
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contestations” (pg. 381). In this section, I discuss a few of Political Ecology’s conceptual 
tools that I made use of in this thesis. I also point to the linkages between Political Ecology 
and contemporary approaches to analyzing precarious work.  
 Analytical tools: scale, livelihoods and micropolitics 
 While arguing for the application of Political Ecology to the “developed” world, 
McCarthy (2002) identifies its “ten major themes.” While every theme he identifies may 
apply to oil development on the Bakken, three are of particular interest to this thesis: the 
use of multiple scales of analysis (in Robbins’ terms cited above: “linkages”), an emphasis 
on livelihoods, and careful study of micropolitical struggles over the meaning and history of 
resources (McCarthy 2002:1283). I discuss below how these themes have concrete 
applications to temporary work in the Bakken. 
 In contrast to the typical SIA, Blaikie (1985: 82) describes the successful integration 
of social factors in terms of a “’bottom-up’ analytical approach.” This approach begins with 
the “smallest decision-making unit,” then traces the political and economic factors that 
underlie this unit’s interactions with resources at local, regional, national, and global scales 
(ibid). Thus, analyses of environmental issues begin with local understandings of 
livelihood, landscapes and natural resources and then seek to link them to large-scale 
structural conditions. My effort to forge these linkages included an emphasis on exploring 
temp workers’ understandings of the Bakken landscape, their personal motivations and 
histories, and their experience of the post-fordist organization of labor. In clarifying who is 
doing what to whom in the Bakken, I attempted to identify patterns and causal linkages 
across multiple scales.  
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 While this thesis is focused on the micropolitics that take place in the temporary 
work environment, it would trivialize the struggle of temporary workers to isolate these 
from the broad spectrum of activities they engage in to stay alive. Scoones (2009) offers a 
political-ecological definition of livelihoods that goes beyond one-dimensional approaches 
that only examine wage-earning vocations or resource use. Instead, he theorizes 
livelihoods as a “complex bricolage or portfolio of activities” used to enable human life in a 
given context (Scoones 2009:2). A political-ecological analysis of livelihoods begins with a 
“local” perspective, attempting to understand the complex, changing systems by which 
individuals and groups literally make their living. Political Ecologists most often achieve 
this by observing these practices directly.  
 This definition of livelihoods is a reminder that wage-work alone does not constitute 
a living. Rather, workers employ multiple practices to sustain themselves and their 
households. In the Yukon forests, livelihoods practices encompass timber operations, 
firewood collection, and gathering non-timber forest products (Natcher 2004). As I explain 
below, for temp workers in the Bakken, these practices included transportation and 
housing arrangements (or alternatives to housing) while on- and off-shift, among others. In 
keeping with a Political Ecological approach, I engaged in direct observation to understand 
how these activities constituted a temporary livelihood in the Bakken. 
 Political Ecology’s multiscalar approach winds up creating a tension between 
“macrostructural frameworks” and “the nuances of social actors’ livelihood struggles” 
(Moore 1993:381). A palliative to this tension, Moore (1993) suggests, is to root analyses in 
direct observation of the enactment of power and resistance. Moore argues that this is the 
primary site of the struggle for meaning. Moore illustrates (among others, e.g. Neumann 
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2003), that symbolic and material struggles over the definition of landscape are associated 
with the coercion and alienation of local populations. The meaning of nature and natural 
resources is “produced” in the contest to control resources and landscapes (Neumann 
2003). Moore’s use of de Certeau’s concepts of strategy and tactics illustrate this dynamic 
on a micropolitical scale. 
 Tactics and ideology 
 De Certeau’s definition of strategy involves the isolation of “a subject of will and 
power” from its environment (de Certeau 1984: xix). Strategists define the spaces in which 
power operates. Colonial map-making and modern urban planning are illustrations of this 
relationship, where powerful others shape both symbolic and material space, thereby 
defining the parameters for both domination and resistance. Tactics, on the other hand, are 
employed by those without power over space. Rather than spatial manipulation, tactics 
depend on patience, a temporal practice—a tactic “is always on the watch for opportunities 
that must be seized ‘on the wing’” (ibid.:xix). As I demonstrate below, the Temporary Labor 
Company (TLC) shaped both the geographic and labor mobility (Smith 2006) of workers in 
the Bakken labor market1. Rather than behaving like economic widgets, however, temp 
workers developed a wide variety of tactics to “keep their feet”: i.e. survive long enough to 
find desirable positions in the labor market. 
 Datta et al. (2007) argue for displacing the concept of “coping strategies” with 
“coping tactics” in studies of precarious economic and social conditions. This is not a 
quibble over vocabulary, but a theoretical nuance that pays attention to the experience of 
contemporary inequality. Datta and her co-authors argue that, under a flexible economy, 
                                                 
1 In other words, TLC not only strategically organized workers in space, it also helped its clients (jobsite 
supervisors) deny workers their tactical advantage in time. 
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migrant workers’ ability to form long-term goals and aspirations—AKA strategies—is 
compromised. Thus, like temp workers, their concerns are limited to daily survival and the 
tactical maneuvers that enable it.  
 As I discuss later, however, temp workers in the Bakken did have long-term 
strategies that accounted for their presence there. Rather than rational calculations, these 
strategies had their basis in ideology, defined by Dant (2013) as a “process of socially 
contingent values, interpretations and taken-for-granted knowledge that is necessary for 
the operation of society” (pg 5). Importantly, this definition of ideology does not posit some 
Truth by which to judge the validity of a system of beliefs. Rather: 
…ideology is cast not as the bogey of false knowledge to contrast with the 
purity of [social and natural] science as truth, but as a process that is 
intertwined with all other social processes including science. The analysis of 
ideology demonstrates that cultural forms which obscure the concrete 
relations between human beings do not do so willfully by following the 
conscious intentions of particular humans. (pp. 5-6) 
 
In the practice of everyday life, actors strategically employ ideologies to formulate and 
justify their tactical choices2.  
 Analyzing power and creative resistance in the Bakken region allows for a more 
complete understanding of the dynamic between structure (strategy) and agency (tactics) 
                                                 
2 In a preliminary interview I conducted, a Bakken well-site geologist made use of what I term oil boom 
ideology to portray the need for her job. When I pressed her about the ramifications of her work for climate 
change, she cited what she saw as the geopolitical benefits of fracking: 
 
We need to frack … in order to get our dependence off of foreign oil. That would be huge for 
this country...The Middle East has quite the hold on us, right now. That's all petroleum based. 
We want it. Why do you think we've been over in the Middle East so long? It's not because 
we care.  
 
That is, her work is not only an escape from living paycheck to paycheck (something we discussed earlier in 
the interview), but also a political-economic fix to global conflict. I will discuss the relationship between temp 
worker tactics on the Bakken labor market and this narrative of historical significance and bounty in my 
findings section below.  
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on the Bakken Shale. In this thesis, I focus on the micropolitical struggles of temp workers 
in the Bakken labor market. I ask how these workers—whose lives on and off shift are 
framed by the strategies of TLC and its clients—tactically engage with these strategies in 
pursuit of a secure livelihood.   
 Gold (1977) suggests that the most significant social impacts of energy extraction 
are the introduction of non-local values and lifestyles. Examining the micropolitics of a 
precarious organization of labor will add another dimension to Gold’s observation by 
revealing some of the ways these non-local values and lifestyles condition, and are 
conditioned by, the temporary labor process.  
 
Sociology of Work 
 Casas-Cortes (2014) documents the development of the concept of precarity in 
European social movements, where academic definitions were taken up and transformed 
in struggles surrounding les intermittents, cognitive (“immaterial”) work, migration rights, 
and feminist activism. Through contact with these movements, precarity moved from 
category to process, from structural invention to bodily state. In keeping with this 
development, I briefly discuss the scholarship on the structural shift to precarity in the late 
20th century below, then situate the development of the temporary work industry (an 
institution that derives profit from precarity) within this shift, and, finally, discuss precarity 
in terms of human activity—the labor process.   
Rodgers and Rodgers (1989) define work precarity as the absence of living wages, 
unions, statutory protections, stability, and benefits coupled with heightened work 
intensity (cited in Young 2010). Scholars of work in the United States and elsewhere (Mills 
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and Täht 2010) have found that work precarity is unevenly distributed across gender—
with women disproportionally occupying such jobs (Young 2010); and race—where 
minorities tend to be in “less desirable and less secure employment” (Vallas 2003). 
 The contemporary “economy that never sleeps” (Presser 2004) is a product of the 
social, political and cultural processes that shaped the development of capitalism since 
Ford (Vallas 2012). Fordism was characterized by stable institutional structures and the 
resocialization of people into effective work instruments (Meyer 1980). The 1970s and 
1980s saw the decline of large firms and their replacement by networks of smaller, highly 
specialized firms that sought to minimize investments in employees (Lambert 2008), 
especially in “dynamic, uncertain economic environments” (Vallas 1999:86). The rise of 
precarious work is part of a post-Fordist adaptation to changing global socioeconomic 
conditions by means of “flexible accumulation” (Harvey 1989, cited in Vallas 1999:88).  
 Flexible accumulation refers to the capacity of corporate networks to collapse or 
expand market activities to maximize the accumulation of capital (Vallas 1999). In terms of 
work arrangements, flexible accumulation requires the downsizing of fixed labor and 
inventories. Instead of the lifelong occupational arrangements characteristic of Fordism, 
subcontracting, the use of nonstandard work hours (i.e. nights, long-term shifts), and labor 
market intermediaries—including temporary work companies—are hallmarks of flexible 
accumulation. This new occupational paradigm shaped the development of the Bakken 
labor market. For the first time, the system of employers overseeing rapid industrial 
growth in the area had a formal institution to manage surplus labor: the TLC.  
 Temporary work 
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 Temporary labor arrangements are characterized by “triangular employment 
relationships” (Córdova 1986:643), where workers are subject to both their nominal 
employers (the temporary labor company) and their jobsite supervisors (the temporary 
labor company’s client). As I discuss at length in the following sections, this relationship 
complicates, but does not fundamentally alter, the production of consent described by 
Burawoy (1979).  
 The figure below illustrates this relationship. Workers and temporary labor 
companies (TLC) are accountable to both of the other parties in the arrangement, while 
“clients” (i.e. jobsite supervisors retaining TLC services) are accountable to no one, or 
perhaps only weakly to the temporary labor companies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the daily life of the temporary worker is marked by competing demands. On the one 
hand, they vie for a “return ticket” (Bartley and Roberts 2006)—a document signed by the 
client to secure the workers’ labor from the TLC for another day. On the other, they must 
present themselves as “reliably contingent” on the TLC (Peck and Theodore 2011). This 
dance is, as one of the workers at the Bakken TLC put it, the essence of “keeping your feet” 
in this precarious work arrangement.  
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 The legal and economic institutions that make temporary work (as we know it) 
possible developed along with flexible accumulation and the neoliberal state. Formally 
recognized labor market intermediaries have existed since the late 19th century. However, 
it has only been since WWII that temporary labor companies negotiated, and eventually 
secured, an important legal distinction: employer status (Gonos 1997). This allowed the 
temporary labor company Manpower, Inc. to be among the largest private employers in the 
United States by the 1990s.  
 Employer status cemented the primary service temporary labor companies offer 
their clients: a legitimate way to avoid the legal entanglements of traditional employment 
(Gonos 1997). As I argue later, moving the dynamics of labor mobility (i.e. moving to a 
different employer) from the jobsite to the temporary labor company also helps clients 
avoid the moral and tactical entanglements involved in allowing negotiation between 
workers and management over the labor process.  
 Just as the flexible economy rose to dominance, labor process research and theory 
identified worker-management negotiations as critical to securing the consent of workers 
to the Fordist labor process. Yet the dynamics of consent and the labor process after the 
divorce of jobsite supervisor and employer have yet to be sufficiently theorized (under 
temporary labor arrangements: these roles are transformed to “client” and “dispatcher,” 
respectively). Below, I summarize Michael Burawoy’s Manufacturing Consent (1979), the 
foundational study of consent on the shop floor, and preview how I apply these theories to 
the temporary jobsite.  
 The labor process  
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 Burawoy’s shop floor ethnography at Allied Corporation’s machine shop is 
considered a classic in the study of the labor process (Smith 2016). Burawoy outlines the 
work process under Fordism’s late configuration—what he and other Marxist economic 
sociologists term “monopoly capitalism.” I make parallels to Burawoy’s analysis throughout 
this thesis. In particular, I consider how the internal labor market, internal state, and 
worker “games”3 have transformed under flexible work arrangements. I summarize these 
concepts below.   
 In many ways, TLC represents an evolution of both the internal state and the 
internal labor markets Burawoy describes at Allied. TLC, like the internal state Burawoy 
described in Allied’s machine shop in 1979, “organize[s], transform[s], or repress[es] 
struggles over relations in production and relations of production” (pg. 110). 
Simultaneously, it functions as a labor market that seeks to “bring the supply and 
distribution of labor under its control” (pg. 198) for the use of its clients. Unlike the internal 
state and labor market, the TLC did not provide a system of governance within the firms 
present in the Bakken. In keeping with other trends under flexible accumulation, the TLC 
offered the features of the internal state and labor market as a contracted service to clients. 
 Developing earlier theories of the labor process, Burawoy argues that the pace and 
efficiency of the labor process at Allied could be explained in terms of an informal set of 
rules and production techniques he described as “a game workers play” (Burawoy 
1979:51). Workers and their direct managers were motivated to play these games to 
satisfy “repressive needs” while ensuring a mutually agreed rate of production (Burawoy 
1979, Marcuse 1964:4). Burawoy’s central claim is that participation in these games 
                                                 
3 I refer to these as tactics, since the term better captures their temporary, provisional nature under 
precarious work arrangements.   
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“manufactured consent” to the production process, thereby both “obscuring and securing 
surplus labor” (Burawoy 1979:81).  
 In work arrangements under monopoly capitalism (as opposed to flexible 
arrangements), the labor process is defined by long-term negotiations between workers 
and management—a “moral economy of the workplace” (Penney 2006:145). The games 
described by Burawoy, for example, “emerge[d] historically out of struggle and bargaining” 
at Allied Corporation’s machine shop (1979:80). In a contemporary example, Penney 
(2006) describes the influence of distinct “working class collective histories” on 
unionization attempts in two similar hospitals.  
 This is due, in part, to the tendency of firms under monopoly capitalism to develop 
strong internal states that incentivized long-term employment. As a result, Burawoy 
observed a labor process that, in his view, was largely insulated from the effects of 
“externally produced consciousness”—ideologies from outside the shop floor. For 
Burawoy, even the ideology of the “cash-nexus” did not exert significant power over 
worker behaviors in the games at Allied. Yet, he acknowledges that “the idiom of making 
money” is likely what brought “the worker to the factory gates” in the first place (1979: 
138-139, emphasis in original). For many Bakken temp workers, the TLC—and each job 
allocated to them by the TLC—represented the “gates” to a diffused and flexible “factory” 
composed of numerous contractors in oil and related industries. 
 While the sociology of precarious work and the labor process has much to offer my 
study, its focus remains on urban industrial, or, more lately, service contexts. Gretchen 
Purser’s insightful ethnographic studies of temporary work (2006, 2009, 2012) describe an 
urban version—with notable similarities and differences—of what I saw in the Bakken. The 
 20 
contribution of this thesis is its discussion of the ramifications of temporary work 
arrangements in a rural, “boomtown,” context. As I will demonstrate, this context was 
significant for both the functioning of the Bakken labor market, the role of TLC in the labor 
market, and the ideological and tactical options open to temporary workers. 
 
METHODS 
 To understand the role of temporary labor in contemporary rural industrial change, 
I spent six weeks in the Bakken region as a participant observer. The bulk of my fieldnotes 
are records of my experiences and observations of the dynamics of job allocation at the 
temporary labor company (TLC) and the temporary labor process at jobsites. I also 
recorded my experience as a resident of an RV Park—an affordable place for migrant 
workers to live long-term—and the lives of my neighbors there.  
Two “boomtown” characteristics, discussed in more detail in the findings section, 
presented practical obstacles to my research: high costs of living and volatile labor 
markets. While my limited resources (both financial and temporal) constrained my ability 
to conduct a long-term field study, they also put me in a similar socioeconomic position as 
many of the people I worked with. I (inadvertently and intentionally) traced similar 
geographic and institutional pathways to and from the Bakken labor market as other temp 
workers. I sought work as other temp workers did. I slept, ate, and ached much as they did. 
By living in an RV Park and working at the TLC, the phenomena I studied began to leave 
physiological traces, even within the short timeframe I had to conduct my observations. 
While this literal embodiment generated insights into the temporary labor process, it also 
highlighted the social distance between my co-workers and me.   
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I presented myself as a student researcher to my neighbors at the RV Park, and 
answered whatever questions they had about my fieldwork (which were surprisingly few). 
Typically, their response to learning that I was a researcher was to tell me everything they 
knew about temporary labor in the region, including their own involvement in it. Following 
Purser’s (2009) reasoning, I did not advertise my motives at the TLC. When asked, I 
explained I was a master’s student in sociology there to make some money and “check 
things out.” Again, it was unusual to be asked in the first place—young white men with 
diverse backgrounds circulated into and out of the area on a regular basis. I am certain that, 
had the nature of my research been disclosed to TLC dispatchers, the project itself would 
have been compromised. At the least, I would have been dispatched on fewer jobs and been 
managed differently by the TLC. Needless to say, to protect their identities, I have chosen 
new names for all the people and institutions mentioned in this thesis.  
 
The Advantages of Temporary Work for Participant Observation 
Initially, I was drawn to the TLC as an observation site because it appeared to be a 
convenient way of accessing the oil industry in the Bakken given my limited resources. As I 
discovered more about the importance of temporary work in the contemporary economy, I 
realized that the presence of the TLC in the region, rather than the informal day labor 
arrangements of the past, was worth studying on its own. I decided to focus on the TLC and 
the temporary labor process, rather than taking on more steady work, because it 
represented one of the ways this “boom” was different than any other. While other labor 
market intermediaries existed in the Bakken, I chose TLC because it was the first place 
nearly any worker with documentation could get a job upon arriving in Williston. 
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 I worked for and waited at TLC for over 90 hours, and spent my time off scouting 
abandoned encampments outside Williston, writing fieldnotes, talking to neighbors in the 
RV Park, and getting by on cold cuts and coffee. I generated over 125 pages (single spaced) 
of fieldnotes, dozens of pictures, and gathered as many employment documents from TLC 
as possible. In general terms, my fieldnotes document my experience circulating into and 
out of the region. I carefully documented the trip to and from the Bakken, community life in 
the RV Park, the temporary labor process on five separate jobsites, and the experience of 
“waiting for work” (Purser 2006) in the morning at the TLC. By expanding my observations 
beyond the worksite, I was able to get a sense of temp workers’ precarious existence in the 
Bakken—from being far from family, to replacing calories after a long day of work, to 
trouble-shooting car repairs.  
 As I discuss below, the ways TLC dispatchers allocated jobs were obscure to temp 
workers. That obscurity, and the dwindling numbers of jobs, gave rise to a sense of direct 
competition for jobs in the mornings. This made it difficult to find ways to interact with 
temp workers at the TLC. Building rapport with other temp workers on the jobsite, on the 
other hand, was not difficult.   
 This may be due, in part, to my experience growing up on construction sites, where I 
learned that laboring with another person is a kind of dialogue. Jobsite supervisors and 
other high-status workers expect subordinates to anticipate their movements. I was taught 
at a young age that an effective assistant studies their superior’s habits of movement 
closely, learning to be prepared to hand over the right tool, handle-side out, without any 
verbal direction.  
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 Among peers, this anticipation goes both ways. Working with one or more people on 
a manual task, especially an arduous one, means coordinating movements and (ideally) the 
tactical logic behind them. Even in temporary work, where both co-workers and the jobsite 
are unfamiliar, I found that a sense of solidarity rises spontaneously out of the common 
rhythm this kind of manual labor4 promotes. For example, Fred (a temp worker around my 
age) and I had long-winded debates on climate change, the nature of capitalism, and other 
social issues. Yet the fact that we worked well together (i.e. we worked at similar paces and 
operated under compatible logics) gave rise to a mutual respect that overrode our 
ideological disagreements. 
 While temporary labor is a difficult way to make a living, it provides ample 
opportunities for note taking. After a short period in the field, I settled into a rhythm of 
working for a day (or more, if I was given and chose to accept a return ticket) and 
retreating the next day to the Richland County Public Library to write accounts of the 
experience based on memory, voice memos, and notes recorded in my smartphone (an 
innocuous way of recording details in the field). While I found this time essential for 
writing exhaustive fieldnotes, the demands of recording these experiences meant I did not 
seek work or labor like other temp workers. As I describe in my findings section, my 
coworkers had more incentive than I did to protect their bodies from the stresses of 
manual labor, since they had to plan on working as much as possible. On the other hand, I 
had the luxury of working as hard as I wanted since I could plan on being sedentary as 
necessary.  
                                                 
4 This may be specific to construction sites, where the movements it takes to complete a task are shaped by 
the particular conditions at each site. In a factory setting (for example), the labor process is more readily 
isolated, constant, and predictable. 
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Ethical Considerations of Participating in Temporary Work 
 Early on, it dawned on me that when I was dispatched on jobs I was replacing 
someone who may have needed the work to eat dinner that night, send money back home 
to their families, or develop contacts in the region. I did not find any answers to the ethical 
questions this raises, but I salved my conscience by putting other workers first when 
possible. I waited for others before volunteering for jobs5, consistently arrived late (after 
the first few days), left my tools behind (even a decent pair of work gloves signaled prestige 
to workers, dispatchers, and jobsite supervisors), and turned down jobs from employers 
that I knew were looking to hire temporary workers in less-temporary positions. As I 
discuss in the findings section, none of these choices prevented me from finding work.  
 Similar ethical problems arose on the jobsite. Because I had less to lose and more to 
gain (e.g. gathering information on jobsite dynamics) from interacting with jobsite 
supervisors than other workers, I often represented my coworkers if, for instance, there 
was an issue with our tools or we needed clarification with a task. This meant jobsite 
supervisors did not immediately dismiss me as they did temp workers who were nervous 
about approaching them6.  
 I soon realized that it was ethically and methodologically imperative to avoid some 
return tickets, volunteer my workmates for prestigious jobs, take on tasks that would cost 
some coworkers too much physical strain, and downplay my own construction experience. 
I considered it important to do these things because the men I worked with strove for and, 
                                                 
5 On rare occasions, dispatchers would desperately ask for volunteers for jobs. Usually they were looking for 
someone with a vehicle.   
6 Jobsite supervisors often assumed this meant they were “fucked up on something” (Williston: 7/15). 
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in most cases, needed any opportunities that might arise from our work. Additionally, 
within the short timeframe of my fieldwork, I decided it was more important to embark on 
a horizontal survey of the experiences of temporary workers at multiple sites, rather than a 
vertical survey of work on a single jobsite.  
 These choices at TLC and on the jobsite likely biased my data somewhat. I purposely 
remained in an indeterminate phase in labor circulation (described in the findings section), 
and thus have less information about what it is like to acquire a job through TLC and 
become incorporated into a more “stable” work environment (as well as be laid off from 
that stable environment and return to TLC). However, this approach was both ethically and 
methodologically sound because it compensated for the structural (education, class 
background) and tactical (my livelihood as graduate student was only supported by TLC) 
privileges I carried with me to the field. Based on what I know about other temporary 
workers, my experience approximated theirs more, not less, closely because of these 
choices.  
 
FINDINGS 
 Many of the institutional practices that constitute the low-skill labor market7 in the 
Bakken were produced and contested at The Temporary Labor Company (TLC). I was also 
part of a diffuse national network of over 60 other TLCs of the same brand. TLC was at once 
a local and a national institution—a site where the structural dynamics of neoliberal 
capitalism and the choices of local actors collided on a daily basis. TLC fed on and 
perpetuated the contradictions of “scalar politics” in Jamie Peck’s (2002) sense of the term. 
                                                 
7 Somers describes markets as analytical constructs that are based empirically in “a complex of institutional 
practices” (2008: 87). 
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Unlike Burawoy’s co-workers at Allied, temp workers in the Bakken did not negotiate the 
terms of their employment with jobsite management, but struggled to sell it to the market 
itself (as represented by the TLC). In this context, the drive among workers and managers 
to develop games in the labor process under monopoly capitalism was repurposed to 
develop tactics in the Bakken labor market.  
 Rogers (1995) describes how temporary labor arrangements subject temp workers 
to heightened alienation from self, others, and the work process. In the Bakken, alienation 
extended to the history of “struggle and bargaining” (Burawoy 1979: 80) integral to 
defining the work process in the first place. The mechanism for this alienation is the 
process, under temp labor, of grafting labor “markets” (i.e. TLC) onto worker-employer 
relations, in effect removing the temp worker from the history of the production process. 
The benefits won and concessions made in prior workers’ tactical engagements with 
employers appear to temp workers as either institutional arrangements or entitlements 
they will only deserve once they find stable work.   
 Moving the employment relationship outside history prevents workers’ 
comprehension of “[themselves] by knowing [themselves] to have been produced as by 
[themselves] through the production of past subjects” (Habermas 1971:39). In the absence 
of an unmediated relation to the “alien being” to whom labor is being sold and a sense of 
past negotiations between management and worker, many temp workers turn to what 
brought them to the region in the first place: an oil boom ideology. This ideology is a 
specific form of “market fundamentalism” that explains and justifies worker participation 
in the production of surplus value as products offered by the TLC to its clients.  
 27 
 Without exception, the temp workers I encountered were economic migrants 
seeking out the jobs and high wages promised by oil development. As such, they had no 
long-term relationship with the larger community or TLC itself. Temp workers in the 
Bakken, along with economic migrants in other contexts, “come from outside and remain 
apart from the social structure in which jobs are located” (Piore 1980: 34. For a 
contemporary illustration, see Anderson 2010. I return to this point below). Temp workers’ 
migrant status made their alienation, and their dependence on TLC, all the more profound.  
 This section of the thesis will examine the implications of removing long-term 
worker and management negotiations from the labor process in a “boomtown” context. I 
discuss how this arrangement defined the ways TLC organized and redistributed the 
temporary labor force in the Bakken, and how workers themselves participated in and 
resisted the commodification of their labor. The first half outlines how the formal and 
informal practices of the TLC constitute labor as a commodity on the Bakken labor market. 
The second half describes how worker tactics in the temporary labor process interact with 
oil-boom ideology to form a “mechanism[ ] through which surplus value is simultaneously 
obscured and secured” (Burawoy 1979: 30). This analysis shows how the institutional 
practices that constitute the Bakken labor market were initiated by the oil-boom ideology 
and sustained by the tactics temp workers used to “keep their feet.” 
 
 
 
Managing The Bakken Labor Market 
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 While the city of Williston, North Dakota experienced explosive population growth 
during this period of industrial development, it is still a small town in a rural state8. Thus, 
the TLC had a more important and more salient role in developing the regional labor 
market than it would in an urban context. This section will attempt to define that role, 
specifically as it relates to the temporary workers themselves. In doing so, I will begin to 
identify the social and economic relationships to which temporary workers gave their 
consent.  
 Benner argues labor market intermediaries (LMIs) not only shape labor supply and 
demand and the relations between workers and employers, but are “a third significant 
category of actors affecting the basic structure of regional labor markets” (2003: 622). In 
Benner’s analysis, LMIs are essential for modulating the “speed and character of 
adjustments in regional labour markets” (622), especially in volatile economic contexts. 
Similarly, Purser characterizes urban temporary labor agencies as a “mop” that soaks up 
“an ‘on demand’ pool of laborers” and “wrings” them out “to meet the flexible needs of 
capitalism” (2009: 19). Purser and Benner’s observations of urban LMIs largely applied to 
TLC, but dependence on a single commodity and the relative isolation of rural North Dakota 
resulted in a starker need to adjust labor markets to wide variations in the price of oil. 
More to the point, the rural setting resulted in a real need to process and manage labor 
imported from urban and rural reserves across the US and the world. TLC emerged as an 
                                                 
8 The population estimate for Williston in 2014 was 24,562 (2015 estimate not available. 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/3886220 accessed 2/19/15). North Dakota’s 
estimated 2015 population was 756,927 (http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/38). 
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institution that could meet, and profit from, those demands by facilitating the circulation of 
labor from distant places and of diverse qualities into and within the Bakken labor market9.  
 Specifically, TLC received incoming workers—especially those without existing 
employment arrangements and/or social networks in the region—and performed basic 
intake processes, like establishing employment contracts, doing background checks, and 
identifying skills. After intake, workers were sorted—first the skilled were divided from 
the unskilled, then, through the judgment of TLC dispatchers, the “hard workers” from 
others. “Hard workers” were given access to jobs that were more likely to result in long-
term employment outside the TLC. Once sorted, TLC helped retain workers on the Bakken 
labor market by maintaining a pool of surplus workers and providing a means for laid off 
“hard workers” to continue to make a wage until more long-term employment could be 
found. TLC redistributed retained workers to ancillary industries as demand for labor 
waxed in construction and waned in oil, or vice versa.  
 While it is tempting to imagine these moments as discrete stages in a circular 
process—intake, sorting, retention and redistribution—on the ground, they happened 
alongside each other, overlapped, and were repeated, aborted and mixed on a case-by-case 
basis. Further, temp workers were far from passive inputs in this process. For instance, two 
of my co-workers had consciously circulated into and out of the Bakken (and elsewhere) 
for years when I met them. Jon, a born-again southern man in his late fifties, moved around 
the United States every summer in search of work as an uncertified mason. In 2014 and 
2015, Williston (where an unskilled temp worker could earn $14 an hour at minimum) was 
                                                 
9 TLC was not the only temp agency in the Bakken, nor were temp agencies the only type of LMI. The Williston 
Job Service and other state-run LMIs, as well as websites like bakkenhelpwanted.com also played important 
roles in shaping the labor market there. TLC was the most important LMI for men who came to the region 
with little or no resources, however.  
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his first stop. Matt, a man in his thirties, worked a string of seasonal and temporary jobs in 
Williston and, most recently, Alaska, for several years. Both of these men lived in makeshift 
tents hidden at the margins of Williston. While Matt wanted stable employment, benefits, 
and long-term shelter, Jon (at least in conversation with me) embraced his peripatetic 
livelihood. 
 Others were stuck in one stage of circulation or another. Hunter and Fred, both Iraq 
war veterans, were laid off from their oil jobs during the downturn of January 2015. Both 
were working for the TLC while waiting for another chance at working in oil. Hunter was 
moving into the informal economy—through under-the-table work via craigslist and 
possibly his “drug dealer” (his description) roommate. Fred was suspended somewhere 
between retention and redistribution. He was formally employed by TLC but was housed 
and given a stipend by his jobsite employer of the last three months (a construction 
contractor).  
 The functional explanation given above—intended to quickly describe the ebb and 
flow of the Bakken’s precarious labor market—implies a strategy with a coherence neither 
intended nor practicable by TLC or its personnel. In fact, TLC was hard-pressed to process 
the numbers of bodies it had on hand into sellable labor. In the bustle and confusion of 
early morning job allocation, dispatchers looked more like harried social workers than 
street-wise “fleshpeddlers” (Purser 2009: 63). This lead to a constant friction between 
enacting official TLC practices and fulfilling the TLC’s mandate to “address [client’s] 
dynamic staffing needs.” In other words, labor circulation was the outcome of a set of ad-
hoc expectations, values and practices emerging from the interaction between workers, 
TLC dispatchers, clients and jobsite supervisors to satiate the demand for labor in the 
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Bakken. This “moral economy” of temporary labor defined worker “expectations of 
management, sense of fairness in the employment relationship, acceptable and 
unacceptable managerial actions, and [worker] contributions to the labor process” (Penney 
2006:145, footnote).  
 Contracting out the internal labor market 
 The moral economy of the work process is usually thought of in the context of the 
historical relations between management and workers on a single work site. Yet the 
“triangular” workgroup that characterizes temporary labor insulates employers from 
negotiations with workers over control of the work process. Further, temp workers in the 
Bakken region do not have a generations-long history within a single institution (e.g. a 
hospital or factory) to anchor their negotiations. 
 The removal of the history of the work process in temp work begins with the 
arrangement of the workgroup. At TLC, the workgroup was composed of temp workers, 
TLC dispatchers, and jobsite supervisors. Dispatchers, as “employers,” handled intake and 
sorting: the application process, the allocation of jobs, and the management of behavioral 
problems among workers. Jobsite supervisors, as “clients,” delegated tasks on the jobsite 
and supervised temporary workers, usually without intervening in their behaviors. Jobsite 
supervisors gave temporary workers instructions for completing tasks, but they rarely 
involved themselves directly in the work process. Instead, temp workers were used for 
well-defined menial tasks such as jobsite clean up or moving materials by hand. Thus, temp 
workers’ “expectations of management” were largely restricted to expectations of TLC 
dispatchers, rather than jobsite supervisors.  
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 The moral economy of temp labor, then, framed the relationship between 
management and worker not in terms of the work process, but in terms of job allocation. 
The relevant relationship was between temp worker and dispatcher, not temp worker and 
jobsite supervisor. While we were picking up sheetrock scraps in a new building in 
downtown Williston, Hunter related the story of an altercation with another TLC employee 
that demonstrates this relationship: 
Their job was to load appliances from a truck into a newly constructed 
apartment building. When Hunter started helping [jobsite employees] install 
the appliances [rather than completing the task he was given], the other [TLC 
employee] told him to keep unloading. When Hunter refused, telling the 
other man he's not his boss, it turned into an argument. By Hunter's account, 
the other man pulled a box cutter on him and Hunter knocked it out of his 
hand with a 2x4. Hunter said "[TLC] was called there" and they were both 
kicked off the site. (Williston 7/20) 
 
According to Hunter, the other TLC worker was not given another work ticket at the site, 
while Hunter ended up working there again a few days later. Even in extreme 
circumstances, then, TLC clients had almost nothing to do with direct management of TLC 
workers. The same was true, in most cases, of the work process in general. 
 On nearly every work ticket I received, Ken, the lead dispatcher, would briefly 
explain the task before we left for the jobsite. Once we arrived, the jobsite supervisor 
would give us instructions (that, more often than not, contradicted Ken’s10). With a few 
exceptions, we were left basically unsupervised at that point and often had to seek out our 
supervisors if we needed clarification or further instruction. In practice, this meant that 
there was very little to no dialogue between TLC workers and jobsite supervisors. In the 
                                                 
10 One of the more Kafkaesque features of this division of managerial roles was TLC dispatchers’ frequent 
misapprehension of the nature and scope of the tasks jobsite supervisors needed labor for.  
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most extreme case I experienced, the nominal supervisor did not recognize me at the end of 
the workday:  
The supervisor looked at me blankly and asked if she could help me. I told 
her I was from [TLC] and had just finished working the grounds. She 
apologized for not recognizing me, saying she gets "a lot" of people in her 
office every day. I tried to articulate what I had done but received no 
response. She asked me when I arrived. I told her 10:30. She filled out the 
ticket, giving me an "Exceeded," and thanked me. (Williston 7/20) 
 
The desire for a return ticket and a good employee rating regulated the pace and efficiency 
of our work, rather than direct contact with jobsite management. If our behaviors and labor 
practices were deemed inadequate, dispatchers replaced us with other TLC workers the 
next day. By displacing the moment of negotiation from the worksite to the sale of labor 
(the TLC common area), the moral economy of temporary work reduced the need for 
surveillance and other forms of direct control over the work process.  
 In TLC documents, I found that even the means available to workers for defining a 
“sense of fairness in the employment relationship” were displaced from the worksite to the 
temp agency. Temp workers were expected to complete tasks on the jobsite and negotiate 
for jobs and working conditions solely with the temp agency. In the words of the list of 
“house rules” included in the application packet, “If you are mistreated or asked to do 
anything dangerous, and/or the equipment is unsafe tell the client that you must call [the 
TLC] office.” Further: 
Under no circumstance is an employee of [TLC] to contact a client! There are 
to be no phone calls or visits with the clients. In the event of a problem, 
contact [TLC] staff members to resolve it. You are not to handle any issues by 
yourself. Any violation of this rule results in immediate termination.  
 
TLC workers, then, were warned to exert labor-power on the jobsite and communicate 
needs or concerns at the temp agency. To jobsite supervisors, we were pre-packaged 
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bundles of labor-power of varying qualities and capabilities (though dispatchers had no 
systematic way of determining them) to be applied to tasks outside the scope of normal 
activities or in the event their productive capacity was temporarily exceeded. Jobsite 
supervisors were invited to browse this TLC-curated line of products and select the labor 
that suited them best for as much use as they saw fit. Meanwhile, TLC dispatchers enforced 
appropriate behaviors among temp workers primarily through job allocation.  
 The tactical advantage of Burawoy’s workers under monopoly capitalism—rooted 
in long-term relationships with management and the labor process—was negated under 
the temporary and mobile labor regime present in the Bakken. Since the handling of labor 
was divided between jobsite supervisors—the consumers of labor-power—and TLC—the 
producer of labor-power, bargaining between workers and jobsite supervisors was largely 
removed from the labor process. This means that tactics of “making out” in Bakken temp 
labor did not concern disputes over the pace of the work process (as in Burawoy’s (1979) 
analysis), or in its inherent values (as in Penney’s (2006) analysis) but in the struggle to 
sell labor for a wage in the first place. TLC workers engaged in this struggle by making use 
of creative, contradictory, and sometimes highly effective tactics at the worksite and the 
temp agency.  
 Before describing some of these tactics, I outline the ground rules—the strategies—
employed by TLC. These rules set the parameters for worker tactics, and as such, helped 
shape the character of the Bakken temporary labor market.  
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 Contracting out the internal state  
 TLC fulfilled many of the functions of the  “internal state” described by Burawoy 
(1979). In addition to facilitating the circulation of labor, TLC offered its clients a means of 
distributing the legal and economic liabilities of the work process to temporary workers 
(rather than clients or the TLC) and mitigated possibilities for solidarity among these 
workers. Below, I describe how TLC distributes liabilities to workers through the 
employment contract, obscures job allocation practices through the rating system, and 
atomizes cooperative groups of workers through job allocation.  
 I experienced some of the ways TLC bureaucratically framed the “day-to-day” 
employment relationship the day I was hired. Among other things, the paperwork I signed 
that day relieved me of my ability to take TLC to court, to hold TLC liable for dangerous 
working conditions, and of any expectation of employment when I arrived in the morning. 
By participating in TLC’s initial “training,” I demonstrated that I was aware of the 
ergonomic behaviors that reduce the mundane risks of labor, such as injuries related to 
lifting (“lift with your legs”) and repetitive stress. Within a few hours, TLC had effectively 
mitigated its legal responsibility for my employment, the working conditions I was to labor 
under, and any injuries or accidents that resulted from working conditions, happenstance, 
or my behavior.  
 The contract I signed was nearly identical to the one Purser (2009) describes (as 
was the reluctance of the TLC employee to give me a copy). The documents, which I quote 
from directly, included: consent to test for drugs and alcohol should I suffer any “work-
related injury or illness” (and another, separate form consenting to random drug 
screening); an arbitration clause; a waiver relieving clients of all liability for any work-
 36 
related injury; a transportation deduction consent; a “best match to dispatch” procedure 
consent; and a verification that “I understand that my employment with [TLC] is on a day-
to-day basis.”   
 This contract goes further than minimizing liability for clients (something they 
accomplish within a single waiver). Through these documents, TLC structures its 
employment relationship to minimize the likelihood it will be held responsible for worker 
injuries, unfair distribution of jobs, or lack of employment. The transportation deduction 
consent enables TLC to make use of worker vehicles to secure clients that might otherwise 
be too far from TLC for workers without vehicles to reach by foot. The “best match to 
dispatch” consent relieves TLC of the responsibility to fairly, transparently, and objectively 
distribute jobs. Workers’ consent to a day-to-day employment relationship with TLC allows 
TLC to reduce or expand its use of surplus labor as market conditions fluctuate. Finally, its 
drug testing policy and arbitration clause erode workers’ ability to take legal action or be 
remunerated for jobsite injuries. The legal, corporeal and economic risks of employment, 
then, are effectively transferred to TLC workers as a basic condition of their (day-to-day) 
employment.  
 The “training” I underwent later that day consisted of an 18-minute video about 
lifting heavy objects and avoiding repetitive stress injuries, a 3-minute presentation from 
Ken (the head dispatcher) about how to assemble and wear our personal protective 
equipment (PPE), and a brief explanation of TLC’s worker rating system. Ken made it clear 
to us that the training was another way of making us legally responsible for avoiding risk 
on the jobsite, rather than a genuine effort to make us safer or more effective workers.  
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 Perhaps in an attempt to gain our trust, Ken belittled the process with an admixture 
of self-deprecating and patronizing humor. He told the only woman in our group, a small, 
quiet person in her 60s (who I did not see after that day), that if anyone “messes” with her, 
he would “get someone else to beat them up” and asked us if it was appropriate to wear 
hardhats on our butts (Williston TLC: 7/8). At the time, I assumed the perfunctory video 
and PPE demonstration were far less important, practically speaking, than Ken’s 
explanation of the worker rating system. As I discuss below, however, the rating system 
was actually a quantitative front for highly qualitative judgments on the part of dispatchers.  
 According to Ken, at the end of each working day, our jobsite supervisor (the TLC’s 
client) would give us one of three subjective ratings: “did not meet expectations,” “met 
expectations,” and “exceeded expectations.” “Did not meet” was worth zero points on a 10-
point scale, “met” was worth five, and “exceeded” was worth 10. Our “personal rating” was 
the average of our daily scores. Ken went on to explain that jobs would be allocated to 
workers with a good average rating and appropriate skills. In the unlikely event two 
workers had the same qualifications, jobs would be given to those who clocked in first. 
Therefore, he emphasized, we should arrive at TLC “on time” every day (6:00 AM). Later, I 
learned that even this aspect of our training had little to do with how jobs were actually 
distributed to workers.  
 I arrived at TLC around 5:45 AM my second day and found several men already 
waiting for the doors to open: 
[There was a] new black Sentra parked in the TLC parking lot with three men 
sleeping inside. I parked, listening to the radio for a few minutes. One of the 
men got out around 5:50 to see if the doors were open yet and got back in the 
car and laid back down when he discovered they were still locked. He tried 
again and was successful five minutes later. I followed them inside. They 
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deftly passed their cards under the scanner at the front desk and sat down at 
a table. I did the same, awkwardly. (Williston TLC: 7/8) 
 
Ken assigned me to my first job within the hour—ignoring, for whatever reason, the three 
men who clocked in before me.   
 A few weeks into my fieldwork, I started to experiment with how late I could arrive 
at the TLC and still get a job. I arrived at seven AM one day and found about a dozen men 
already signed in, waiting around the circular tables in the TLC common area or on the TLC 
porch smoking cigarettes. I was assigned to a job an hour later.  
 Later, I arrived at TLC as late as 8:20 AM and still found work without difficulty—
even if there were men waiting there who clearly arrived before me and had access to 
vehicles. Further, I had received several “met” ratings during my first job so my average 
score peaked at about eight. This was unusual because most employers with experience 
using temp workers gave “exceeded” scores as a matter of course (such as the supervisor 
described above who did not recognize me at the end of the workday). When I tried to get a 
better sense of the role of the rating system in job allocation, I found that, in reality, the 
scores meant very little:  
I asked Patricia why my "average employee rating" was 5 today when 
yesterday it was 10. She didn't understand. I explained that I would have to 
get a zero today to have an average of 5, and that didn't make sense to me.  
She still didn't understand: "I'm gonna have to ask Ken, he's the numbers 
guy," she said, just as Ken said to me, "I see what you're saying," and started 
looking something up on the computer. I walked over to him, and he 
explained that my 10 average had been a data entry error. I actually had two 
fives … He tried to finish the conversation by throwing up his hand and 
saying, "I know you're a good guy." I shook his hand and thanked him, telling 
him I didn't "take the five personally." He explained that "some people do," 
and that he wanted to make sure that I knew that he knew I wasn't "one of 
those guys who stands around twiddling his thumbs all day" and that would 
be taken into consideration when they divide up jobs in the mornings. 
(Williston TLC: 7/9) 
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So the rating system and arriving on time meant far less to dispatchers than their 
subjective assessment of how hard we worked and our quality as persons (i.e. being a 
“good guy”). The rating system, then, was an “objective” façade obscuring what was, at best, 
an arbitrary practice. 
 In addition to administering risks in the employment relationship, TLC represses 
struggles over production by problematizing the relationship between jobsite supervisors 
and workers in the definition of the moral economy of the workplace (described above), 
employing a “best match to dispatch” policy for the allocation of jobs, separating skilled 
from unskilled workers in the intake process, and maintaining labor circulation. These 
practices minimize temp workers’ ability to organize around common interests.  
 The “best match to dispatch” policy, described above, not only allowed dispatchers 
to arbitrarily assign workers to jobs, it also led to resentment and competition between 
workers. Workers sometimes responded to this arbitrariness with desperation. One 
morning at the TLC, I noted a man I recognized from my first morning leaning over the 
front counter, talking earnestly to the dispatchers: 
He wore a loose green t-shirt and jeans. He was asking [the dispatchers], 
imploring them, for work. At one point he raised his voice and said, "I need 
work, man!" Ken diffused the situation by saying, in ironic pleading tones: "I 
know! Yer kinda loud." (Williston TLC: 7/15) 
 
The man left TLC after the exchange. This sense of direct, physical competition is common 
to other documented temporary work sites that deal primarily in manual labor (e.g. Purser 
2012).  
 The small pool of skilled workers at TLC were carefully groomed and maintained by 
dispatchers and were the only group of people that did not have to show up at the TLC at 
dawn. George, a carpenter, had a particularly close relationship with dispatchers: 
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A thin, tan white man, probably in his early 60s but able-looking, walked in. 
He was about 5'10," wore a cap, jeans, a dark green tank top, a moustache 
and glasses. A pouch on his belt held a flip phone. “Morning George," Patricia 
said brightly as he arrived. He responded genially. He explained that he 
hasn't had coffee for a few days because he had to be on a jobsite at six, and 
nothing was open before then. Pam said she heard he was unhappy at the 
jobsite, he responded that there was nothing wrong with it, but qualified, 
saying "we stayed busier I guess." He said, "Poker is out, eh?" to Ken. Ken 
said, apologetically, "For now." Ken called him over to explain a "payout," 
telling George not to ask any questions until he got a chance to explain. 
George asked a few questions immediately, which Ken fended off, saying he 
lumped all the gas payments into one day since he forgot to do it consistently. 
George seemed satisfied with this. (Williston TLC: 7/20) 
 
Later, I discovered dispatchers regularly texted George to summon him for jobs: 
 
I returned to the TLC and wandered inside. I leaned up against the counter, 
the only "Field Team Member" inside. Vana received a phone call from 
someone asking for a finish carpenter. She took down the usual information 
for the job, then hung up. Politely, she asked if I was a finish carpenter. I said 
no. Then she called Ken and asked him to text George, telling Ken she would 
give George 10 minutes to call in. (Williston TLC: 7/23) 
 
As a skilled worker, then, George did not need to mingle with other temporary workers at 
the TLC, nor was he subject to the same basic expectations. 
 Since TLC was, for many, the first place a job could be acquired in Williston, it was 
not unusual for most of the men and women present every morning to be unfamiliar with 
each other. Further, the random assignment of work teams deteriorated the solidarity 
among temp workers who worked together on previous jobs. Even if cooperative working 
relationships among temp workers had been formed on a single jobsite, once the task was 
over, there was very little chance workers would be assigned together again—or that they 
would see each other again in any case. By chance one morning at the TLC, I ran into Julius, 
a black man in his early twenties from outside Atlanta. It had been ten days since I worked 
with him and two other men. Julius explained the divergent paths each of us took after 
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working together (and, from my perspective, achieving a sense of camaraderie) for a few 
days:  
According to Julius, they worked three or four more days until James got 
another job and/or wasn't willing to drive all the way to Watford City 
anymore. Julius postulated that they dispatched another crew to the site after 
that. He asked me gravely--eyes down, voice quiet--about where I had been--
like I had either let them down or he was seriously concerned about me… 
Then he asked me if I'd seen "that other guy, the short one." I said I hadn't 
seen Matt since last week. (Williston TLC: 7/17) 
 
Whether or not temp workers had been working there for months, TLC was a stop on the 
way to oil-soaked riches, not a final destination—an important feature of consent in this 
context that I discuss in more detail below.  
 Temporary work illustrates a feature of neoliberalism noted in theory (e.g. 
Wacquant 2009 and Foucault 2008) but rejected or obscured in popular discussions: the 
neoliberal political economy does not represent the return of classical economic liberalism, 
where government is made to step aside to “liberate” market functioning, but constitutes 
the active re-regulation of human activity by market devices. Temp labor in this context 
represents a deepening of third party interventions in the employment process, rather than 
liberating the employee-employer relationship from intervention. TLC, as a subcontracted 
internal state, is well tuned to the needs of the highly contingent oil industry and its 
ancillaries, which is itself a system of subcontractors. 
 Yet this strategic arrangement could not function without the enthusiastic 
participation of temporary workers. In the following section, I follow Burawoy in asking 
what accounts for this participation—even in social, economic, and environmental 
conditions far more precarious than the sheltered shop floors of monopoly capitalism.  
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Tactics and Ideology Among Temp Workers 
 Burawoy argues that the strong internal states of firms in monopoly capitalism 
insulate the work process from outside ideology. For temporary workers in the Bakken, 
however, an “externally produced consciousness” (Burawoy 1979: 136) inflected with 
regional language and interests—the oil boom ideology—significantly affected the tactics 
workers used to secure work, both on and off the jobsite, and thus both the temporary 
labor process and the nature of consent. In this section, I describe how oil boom ideology 
and worker tactics perpetuated the temporary labor process. After a brief discussion of the 
living conditions temporary workers endured in the Bakken below, I describe oil boom 
ideology and temp worker tactics both on and off the jobsite.  
 Consent to what? Living conditions for temp workers  
 Any given morning at TLC, men with confederate flags mounted on their trucks sat 
alongside recent migrants from Ghana. The ringing of incoming phone calls from TLC 
clients punctuated Germanic, Romantic and Afroasiatic murmurs. Men in button-up shirts 
waited for work with men who carried all their belongings in tattered school backpacks. In 
short, men (and in rare cases, women) representing a wide range of ethnic, racial, and 
regional identities, made the journey to Williston and ended up at TLC in pursuit of a 
common interest: gainful employment.  Many left their friends, families, and extended 
social networks behind in pursuit of arduous, and frequently dangerous, jobs. Yet most of 
them were aware that, even if they found employment, the high wages they sought were 
rarely enough to cover basic living expenses. A conversation I overheard inside the TLC 
early in my fieldwork indicates these men were acutely aware that the costs of seeking 
work in the Bakken often outweigh the benefits: 
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They discussed Williston: high wages but high rents. In a big city, wages were 
lower but so were rents. In a big city, you could "move around" more easily 
and "fuck bitches." (Williston TLC: 7/8) 
 
People living in the Bakken region between 2008 and late 2015 faced rents as high as 
$1900 a month for a two-bedroom apartment11, inflated prices for goods and commodities, 
and few options for transportation, food and gathering vital information (e.g. trends in the 
barrel price of oil, which ostensibly affected the availability of work). Those attempting to 
make their livelihoods outside traditional employment relationships, such as the 
temporary workers I met, had to make the most of wages alone to survive these conditions.  
 The rapid infrastructural development in Williston was largely oriented to the needs 
of the oil industry—not, for instance, temporary workers without access to vehicles. 
Sidewalks were rare or nonexistent in newly developed areas, and traffic was dangerous 
for large vehicles, let alone bicyclists12. The main industrial thoroughfare in the area, 
Highway 85, was “the most dangerous highway in America,” according to one temp worker, 
who cited its constant reconstruction and preponderance of sleep-deprived tanker drivers 
as evidence. Workers with vehicles or access to vehicles not only had access to 
transportation that was relatively safe and reliable, they were better able to accommodate 
their basic needs, including transforming paychecks into cash, and finding a safe place to 
rest (inside their vehicles, in some cases) and nutritious, or at least affordable, food.  
 Carrying enough food and water to jobsites was a significant daily issue for many 
temporary workers, especially those without vehicles. Workers arrived at TLC in the 
morning without knowing whether they would be expected to work four, eight, or twelve 
                                                 
11 For comparison, fair market rent prices in San Francisco County are around $2,000 a month. 
12 In 2014, Williston had a crash rate of 49.2 per 1,000 people—nearly double the crash rate of the largest city 
in North Dakota, Bismarck (NDDOT 2014:20).  
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hours, whether they would be inside or exposed to the weather, and if water was available 
on jobsites. Once off-shift, workers without vehicles had to choose between walking to the 
grocery store and finding fast food, a gas station, or a restaurant to eat in.  
 Water was especially difficult to find on construction sites. Water wells were usually 
not yet plumbed for daily use on construction sites, and most sites were not within walking 
distance of a water source. Some of the men I worked with were unprepared for this, and 
had to rely on jobsite supervisors or their co-workers to avoid dehydration: 
[The jobsite supervisor] came by and handed all four of us [Julius, Matt, 
James, me] bottles of water. I drank mine quickly, not realizing how 
dehydrated I had become. "It's not cold but it's wet," [the jobsite supervisor] 
explained. "It's not cold but it's not hot," Julius replied, squinting into the sun. 
It was hot in the sunshine, over 85 degrees, and we sweat through our shirts, 
caking the dirt creased into our skins. The stillness and heat of noontime on 
the prairie seemed to settle on us for a moment as we all thirstily drained the 
water bottles. [Watford City: 7/9] 
 
Matt gave Julius some of his water at lunch that day. I ran out of water more than once 
(despite carrying a gallon of it with me every day), and finally began storing six gallons of 
auxiliary water from a gas station in the trunk of my car.  
 To survive these conditions, temporary workers invested their paychecks in a 
diverse array of survival techniques, which in turn shaped possibilities for them to 
manipulate, resist, and consent to the temporary work process. The men I worked with 
developed various means of raising money, acquiring food, information, and shelter, and 
moving from place to place. Jon buried all of his camping equipment in plastic containers 
every winter, Julius convinced other temp workers to transport him to jobsites, and Matt 
could cite employment statistics from across the American west. One man made his pocket 
money by selling expired candy: 
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A beer bellied white man with a long grey moustache balanced his cigarette 
on the brake of his tricycle and left it there smoking while he went inside [the 
TLC]. A variety of chocolate candies were displayed carefully on the tricycle 
seat in their wrappers: a Toblerone bar, a package of Cadbury Eggs, a 
package of bite-sized Butterfingers, and a King-Size Butterfinger. When he 
came back out, I asked if they were for sale. "Yup. A dollar each," he said, 
returning his cigarette to his mouth and smiling smoke out. "Wow, that's a 
good deal," I said, "Where do you get them?" He hesitated a moment, then 
said he gets them "wholesale" so he can "sell them cheap." I nodded 
credulously, then said I'd buy the Toblerone. "Which one?" he said. "The 
triangular one," I said. "Oh, I love those!" He took my dollar bill and handed 
me the bar, telling me the Cadbury Eggs were also delicious. I checked the 
expiration date on the Toblerone later: June 20, 2015. (Williston: 7/23) 
 
Another man carried backpacking gear, a crossbow, and a fishing pole with him on every 
job. For many, then, temp work was more a matter of survival than a game to meet 
repressive needs. The amount of calories expended on the jobsite, the prospect of shelter, 
bodily wear and tear, and exposure to hazardous materials and conditions had to be 
balanced with the need to prove the value of their labor to TLC clients and extend waged 
working hours as long as possible.   
 But why go through the trouble to stay in the Bakken when those wages seemed to 
be disappearing? Why stay in a place with few women (unless, as Matt put it, you have a job 
in oil or “look like Brad Pitt”), few transportation options, and unaffordable housing? I 
argue the ideology that promises plentiful and long-term oil work both justified their 
sacrifices and formed the basis of their tactical logic.  
 Oil boom ideology 
 At least since the 19th century, a narrative of opportunity has marked western 
industrial history. The Americans who did not benefit from the spoils of the first wave of 
colonization looked to the west, we are told, for a place where the liberty to render the 
landscape into a prosperous future (and the liberty to starve in the attempt) was 
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unfettered by professional qualifications, class or caste. Regardless of the validity of this 
narrative, for the men I met at TLC, the Bakken oil boom represented such an opportunity.  
 The 21st century variants of this narrative were on vivid display at TLC. In the iconic 
rushes of the American west, gold and land were the bounty workers sought, but in the 
Bakken it was steady wages. The temporary workers I met thought they would find secure, 
plentiful work in oil in the Bakken. The notion of a “boom” connoted plenty, and security 
was implied by what the media advertised would be a hundred years of industrial 
development13. For the able-bodied, oil work appeared to offer more pay in two months 
than they would normally see in a year, transportation in company trucks, and, typically, 
stable housing (even if in substandard conditions). The promise of these material benefits 
was cemented by the dignity of, as Fred put it, “productive” work extracting a commodity 
that had clear global and historical significance.   
 In the conversation about the differences between Williston and urban areas quoted 
above, one of the men stated he was determined to stay in Williston until the oil market 
recovered, underscoring his determination by stating, “I changed my address” (Williston 
TLC: 7/8). This was a common sentiment among TLC workers.  
 In a conversation I overheard on the TLC porch, where workers talked more freely 
than when within earshot of the dispatchers, a man from California was describing the 
state of U.S. society to two men with heavy accents, who nodded patiently to his soliloquy: 
“America, this country, used to be a great place," he said, "Williston used to 
be a great place." …you used to be able to make good money in Williston, but 
                                                 
13 e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-boom.html?hp&_r=1& 
pagewanted=all&mtrref=undefined. In another example, Gallup rated North Dakota number one in its “good 
jobs rate” even as oil development collapsed and the job-related mortality rate  there was highest in the 
nation in 2015 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/188921/north-dakota-highest-gallup-good-jobs-
rate.aspx?version=print). For a detailed analysis of this discourse in traditional and non-traditional media, 
see Hough (2015).  
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he's still hopeful: he has an [job] interview scheduled for next week. 
(Williston TLC: 7/23) 
 
These workers’ awareness of the increasingly adverse conditions in the Bakken labor 
market was balanced by a determined belief that, as the Californian put it, “as long as I keep 
my feet” the “$10,000 a month job” will come (Williston TLC: 7/23). His “ambition to arise” 
kept him at the TLC, making ends meet in rural North Dakota, even as he struggled to find 
the job that would make his “plans” a reality (Williston TLC: 7/23).  
 Importantly, these plans did not usually include working in the Bakken 
permanently. Rather, for many, long-term plans involved accumulating money through 
(overtime) wages, then investing it in some venture. Fred, an Iraq war veteran in his early 
30s, was the most ambitious, cerebral, and hard-working temp worker I met, and 
exemplified the hope many temp workers put in the oil boom. While his plans were 
unusual in their audacity, they were typical in their general shape: find a job in oil, learn 
industrial skills (including the art of contracting), and invest a critical mass of earned 
wages in something meaningful. While Fred literally looked to the sky for his meaning, 
others sought a sense of security on earth.  
 After being laid off from an oil field contractor specializing in fuel lines in January of 
2015, Fred managed to find a semblance of continuity as a long-term temporary worker for 
a single construction contractor. As we worked together over the course of a few days, Fred 
recalled he had been a “night-owl” since he first looked through a telescope at nine years 
old. After serving in the Marines, he went to a community college near his hometown in 
north Florida, working construction jobs on the side. He planned to specialize in aerospace 
engineering after getting his associate’s degree. He was four credits away from finishing his 
degree when an unsecured scaffold moved out from under him. The fall shattered his left 
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forearm and cracked several vertebrae. Workmen’s comp covered the medical expenses 
and dispersed 66.3% of his pay, but it was not enough to prevent him from dropping out of 
school. As he explained:  
He was in so much pain during his convalescence that he depressed the 
Patient Controlled Analgesia button like he was on "Jeopardy!" (his simile) 
and felt no relief. After being released from the hospital, his girlfriend "took 
[him] in.” The Workmen's Comp benefits were not enough to pay rent, and 
his recovery was a long process. (Williston: 7/26) 
 
His relationship did not survive his recovery. After breaking up with his girlfriend, he went 
to the west coast to get his “head on straight.” While hiking through the Sierra-Nevada 
Mountains, he decided to go to Williston. Once there, he planned on pursuing his 
fascination with space from another angle: 
He said that now, he plans on developing a private launch pad for satellites, 
"like SpaceX," and that his ultimate goal is to start a business on the moon: 
"any business. I don't care if it's a KFC or a whorehouse." He said he may not 
have the engineering chops to do it, but he would organize and plan a 
business and employ engineers to do it: "I don't care if I'm 70 years old. I just 
want to do it." (Williston: 7/26) 
 
He would do this, he went on to explain, by finding another job in oil, diligently saving his 
wages, then making a series of increasingly profitable investments.  
 Perhaps more so than any of the other workers I met, Fred was a believer in the 
benevolence of the invisible hand of the market. Inspired by Ron Paul’s 2008 presidential 
race, he had explored the “Austrian school” of economic thought, eventually settling on an 
economic philosophy he described as “anarcho-capitalism.” He carefully studied markets, 
Federal interest rates, and technological developments with plans to leverage some 
economic trend to pursue his dreams. He believed that, given the removal of government 
intervention, a democracy, expressed through the medium of capital, would arise. The 
declining job market in the Bakken would continue, since the Federal government insists it 
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must "print[ ] money” instead of using the gold standard (Williston: 7/24).  For Fred, the 
Bakken approximated the free market imagined by his economic philosophy and the TLC 
was a valuable “service” (his term).  
 At TLC, workers did not vie for relatively low-paid, low-prestige labor in ancillary 
industries (such as construction) because they thought it would lead directly to a job in the 
oil industry. For workers like Fred, one of the qualifications for actualizing their plans was 
to survive in Williston. Rather than applying for steady jobs through the temp agency 
(though many took them when offered), they were maintaining themselves—“keeping 
their feet”—for the return of demand for labor in the oil industry. 
 The oil-boom ideology was the core justification for a set of expectations, values and 
practices that “subordinate[d] the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” for 
temporary workers in the Bakken region (Polanyi [1944] 2001:75). What was at stake here 
was not just agreeing to certain features of the work process (e.g. work speed), but 
agreeing to be treated as an official product of the TLC and a commodity on the Bakken 
labor market in general. Working conditions, wages, and the values inherent to the work 
process, then, were effectively removed from negotiations between workers and their 
employers. Instead, workers made a case for the quality of their labor-power (i.e. 
convincing employers to hire them over others). 
 Everyone I met during my time in Williston was drawn to the area by the promise of 
the boom. And when workers could not find permanent jobs, they laid blame on the bust. 
The oil boom ideology phrased the choices of a range of economic and political actors in the 
passive voice. Thus, TLC workers discussed the future surplus or deficit of labor like 
hopeful farmers on the lifting of a drought. Vague prognostications were made based on the 
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price of gas per gallon or hearsay, rumors of job openings in the oil industry were passed 
from one temp worker to another nearly every morning, and no one considered TLC to be 
their last employer in Williston. In short, as a rural western variation on the American 
Dream mythos, the oil boom ideology minimized or obscured worker consciousness of 
exploitation by, and dependency on, TLC (to borrow June Nash’s (1979) terms).  
 Yet ideology alone seems insufficient to explain why these workers were still in 
Williston, facing housing instability, isolation, and the precariousness of temporary labor. 
Especially considering that most of them were banking on the increasingly poor chance 
they would get a job in one of the most dangerous industries in the United States (AFL-CIO 
2015:1). Here, I turn from worker ideology to worker behavior on jobsites and at the TLC. 
Following de Certeau (1984), Datta et al. (2007) and others, I refer to the behaviors 
workers use to “get by” in the Bakken labor market as tactics. Like all tactics, temp 
workers’ tactics were a response to the social and material conditions they faced as they 
attempted to enact their long-term plans14. In turn, the oil-boom ideology provided the 
narrative that explained and justified workers’ tactics. My analysis of these data suggests 
that temp worker tactics were both seeded and supported by oil-boom ideology. While 
additional, and different, data are necessary to fully understand this relationship, I argue 
the interplay between tactics and ideology largely explains their consent to treatment as a 
commodity by TLC and its clients.   
 
 
                                                 
14 The myopic temporal scope of temp worker tactics was critical to sustaining consent to precarity. As I 
discussed earlier, workers’ alienation  from the history of the production process prevented the emergence of 
“games” that could have given them substantive control over the labor process.  
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 Tactics on the jobsite 
 Temp workers used numerous tactics on jobsites to maximize their wage-earning 
hours with a single TLC client. On the jobsite, workers attempted to work days as long as 
possible and/or convince jobsite supervisors they deserved a “return ticket.” In both cases, 
worker tactics involved performance and manipulation, rather than explicit bargaining. It 
was imperative to work as slowly as possible without appearing to do so15.  
 Hunter, a laid-off oil worker from near Anaheim, California, demonstrated a few of 
the tactics workers used to maximize the number of hours they spent on a single jobsite, as 
well as the role of oil boom ideology in these tactics. I documented other workers behaving 
similarly, and a few men I worked with described observing these tactics in other workers. 
As I describe below, a minority of temp workers—Fred, for example—took an opposite 
approach, genuinely working hard and hoping to be noticed by TLC clients.  
  Hunter and I were dispatched from the TLC one morning to clear out sheetrock 
from the interior of a building in downtown Williston. Hunter was interested in making as 
much time pass “on the clock” as possible (with minimal effort):  
"I'm not trying to work my ass off for jobs like this16," [Hunter] said… He 
pointed out that taking it slow was job security for us. If the task wasn't 
finished by tomorrow, we would likely have to come back to finish … which 
meant more hours. (Williston: 7/15) 
 
To quote only a few of his time-extending practices: 
 
Hunter had a few ways to accomplish this: he would "take a walk" back and 
forth down the hallway a few times, maybe carrying a piece of sheetrock …  
he would light up a cigarette and let me know that he was going to stop for a 
little while … he avoided using tools such as a sheetrock cart … (Williston: 
7/15) 
                                                 
15 Bartley and Roberts (2006) demonstrate the substantial quantitative (more wages) and qualitative 
(reduced uncertainty) advantages of return tickets for temp workers.  
16 i.e. unskilled, arduous, relatively low-paid, and temporary. 
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While Hunter used these tactics to save himself some strain and perhaps get a return ticket, 
ironically, he was also maximizing his value as a commodity for the TLC, which charges its 
clients by the hour. In terms of enabling the temp agency to accumulate profit through 
surplus labor, Hunter’s attitude toward our work—that it was a means of survival while he 
waited to get back into oil—made him an ideal temp worker. The tactics he used to 
modulate his work speed were, in part, an expression of that attitude—one rooted in the 
ideology of the boom.  
 Before getting laid off, Hunter had discovered a sense of agency in oil work. Being 
part of the process that made what he called “ancient microorganisms” available to fuel 
society filled him with purpose and a sense of mastery (Williston: 7/15). He spoke with 
pride about the technical skills his work required, about its dangers, and about the physical 
strength and long hours it entailed. He emphasized the quantifiable, technical aspects of his 
work in the oil fields (his wage, his expertise with technical systems, the number of hours 
he worked in a week) and the qualitative impacts it had on the landscape. He described 
looking out over a valley punctuated by the metronome nodding of pump jacks he had 
helped install, and waxed poetic about the light of natural gas flares. Hunter invested his 
identity in work that used up all of his waking hours, paid well, and gave him a sense of 
historical significance. It was this pride that motivated him to “keep his feet” by stretching 
wage-earning hours as a temp worker to survive the time between oil jobs.  
 Hunter’s explicit use of these tactics is a good illustration of the dynamics of the 
temporary labor process as I observed them. It is worth noting, however, that many 
workers would not outwardly endorse these behaviors. An interaction on another jobsite 
between me, Julius (another laid-off oil worker) and two other temp workers (Matt and 
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James) illustrates the ambiguous attitude many temp workers had about the wage-
maximizing tactics Hunter used. We had just spent 10 hours unpeeling plastic wrap from 
modular sections of an apartment building being assembled in Watford City (about 45 
miles south of Williston). In a typical jobsite conversation among temp workers, we were 
trying to calculate how many days we might spend on this jobsite: 
After I estimated that uncovering all the modules would take about 45 hours, 
Matt stated that he could see us finishing the work in four 10-hour days. 
Julius replied: "Or, we could take our time, you know what I mean?" No one 
explicitly disagreed with him--but his attitude wasn't taken up by anyone 
else. (Watford City: 7/8) 
 
On another jobsite in Alexander (27 miles south of Williston), Jon, the itinerant stone 
mason who travelled to the Bakken seasonally, implied that Hunter’s tactics were the norm 
among the temporary workers he labored with, but felt ambivalent about the practice 
himself: 
I remarked that we were making good time, and that wasn't necessarily in 
our best interest. Jon said, "I wasn't going to say anything," to me, since 
usually it's the "other guy" who is telling him to slow down. (Alexander: 
7/17) 
 
The tactics temporary workers employed, then, were subject to ongoing negotiations 
among themselves, jobsite supervisors, and agency dispatchers.  
 Negotiation over tactics could lead to conflicts among workers. The conflict Hunter 
described between himself and another TLC worker was, at least in part17, a difference in 
opinion about jobsite tactics. As I described above, Hunter’s insistence on installing 
appliances, rather than moving them, led to both violence and expulsion from the jobsite. 
The other worker wanted Hunter to perform his assigned task, rather than avoid the hard 
                                                 
17 Race was an important factor in this instance as well. Hunter referred to this co-worker as “one of them 
African niggers,” and explained that, since he was “fresh from the village,” he did not appreciate the 
differences between the appliances they were installing.  
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labor of handling heavy appliances. For Hunter, installing the appliances both extended the 
duration of their task and demonstrated his competence to the jobsite supervisor.  
 Some jobsite supervisors seemed to be aware of these tactics and had developed 
counter-measures of their own. Some supervisors, for example, strictly limited the amount 
of time workers spent on the jobsite. On one job, I was instructed to clean the grounds 
around a new apartment complex just north of Williston, which mostly entailed picking 
cigarette butts out of the gravel yards on the ground floor. I was nearly done with my task 
when the jobsite supervisor abruptly dismissed me:  
I knelt to begin picking butts again when [the jobsite supervisor] drove up in 
his truck, parked, and walked toward me. "Hey bud," he said, "You got here 
around 10:30, right?" "Sounds right," I said. "You're done then. Go home--
you're only supposed to be here four hours," he said. "OK?" I said, deflated. 
"Good job," he said consolingly, then answered his cell phone and walked 
back toward his truck. (Williston: 7/20) 
 
This happened at the jobsite Hunter and I worked on as well, where one senior supervisor 
seemed to suspect Hunter’s tactics (despite our other supervisors’ obliviousness). The 
supervisor dismissed us at the end of the day, even though several hours’ labor worth of 
sheetrock still waited to be moved to the dumpster: 
Hunter stood by awkwardly as [the jobsite supervisor] filled out our ticket. 
"Will there be work tomorrow?" Hunter asked. [The jobsite supervisor] 
glanced at Hunter and said they wouldn't need our help tomorrow. He tore 
the ticket on its perforations, pocketing the copy meant for clients and 
handing the other half to me. "You got an Exceeded, though," he said. 
(Williston: 7/15) 
 
Without a return ticket, Hunter and I were officially unemployed as we left the jobsite that 
day. The jobsite supervisor had effectively countered Hunter’s tactics by suspending our 
relationship—thereby moving us from negotiations over the work process back to the TLC 
the next morning.  
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 Tactics at the TLC 
 At TLC, workers sought favorable positions within the obscure hierarchy of job 
allocation discussed above. Temporary workers either accomplished this overtly by 
attempting to develop relationships with dispatchers as they allocated jobs, or less overtly 
by portraying themselves as “hard workers.” Additionally, workers with access to certain 
tools (such as fire-resistant clothing or a vehicle) were much more likely to be selected by 
dispatchers for jobs. While workers mostly gained a reputation for being “hard workers” by 
means of jobsite tactics (e.g. those described above), they developed relationships with 
dispatchers by direct manipulation at the front counter of the TLC.   
 Often, I witnessed front counter tactics being used by workers with less prestige at 
TLC than most other workers—they were or appeared to be less able-bodied, were women, 
did not speak American English, were unable to maintain a hygienic appearance, or had a 
criminal record. I arrived at TLC late in the morning one Monday and observed a 
paradigmatic example of these tactics. The scene was as follows: 
A white man near 30, about 5' 8", walked in from the front porch, used the 
bathroom, then strode up to the front counter, rolling his shoulders. His 
clothing was a mixture of military patterns: boots and a t-shirt in Desert 
Storm tan and a cap and cloth cargo pants in Vietnam greens. His shirt 
stretched smoothly from his collar, over his belly, and into his pants. His belt 
held two black cloth-and-Velcro pouches under his swinging arms. His pants 
had a long tear over the right thigh and calf that flashed pale skin when he 
walked. He had hay-yellow hair that stuck out from under his cap. He 
bantered with the people behind the desk, revealing missing teeth when he 
laughed at Ken's jokes. (Williston TLC: 7/20) 
 
This man not only appeared to not have stable housing (he carried all of his belongings in a 
backpack), he also had to compensate for being on probation. He apologized about not 
being able to take a job Ken had offered him earlier in the morning: 
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He explained to Ken that "if I didn't have that stupid GPS tracker on me then I 
woulda taken that job, but" he had to stay in the state. (Williston TLC: 7/20) 
 
He leaned against the counter, watching the dispatchers take calls, listening intently to the 
details of the jobs dispatchers wrote down, and continuing to chat with them. Soon, he had 
an opportunity to demonstrate to Ken that he understood one of TLC’s cardinal rules: 
A black man, about 5'8", walked in, went straight to the bathroom. He left the 
door open as he urinated. He exited the bathroom and walked straight to the 
front counter. He had a dark blue sweatshirt on that had a "JC Evans 
Construction" logo printed over an outline of Texas. He asked Ken in an 
African accent if he could return to a jobsite where he had worked 
previously. Ken explained that he had been "replaced for the day." The man 
left, walking quickly out the door. The man in camo shrugged, commenting, 
"You don't touch base, you're out." (Williston TLC: 7/20) 
 
The man in camo was repeating the TLC policy that temp workers must call in every 
morning before 7AM if they were going back to a jobsite on a return ticket. If workers did 
not call in or show up at TLC, TLC dispatchers would assume they were unavailable and 
dispatch someone else. The man in camo’s tactics paid off when a road construction job 
came up about ten minutes later:  
The man in camo volunteered for a job "near the roundabout." Ken accepted 
and asked if he had Personal Protective Equipment, the man said he had his 
own hardhat… (Williston TLC:7/20) 
 
It is worth noting that these tactics did not always result in jobs. A few days after I saw the 
man in camo’s success, I watched a few other men use these tactics with no results: 
Two men, the man in the red hat that Jim talked to and another white man 
about the same age, stood at the counter waiting expectantly. "What's the 
situation?" red hat asked. "This job isn't until tomorrow," Vana explained. 
They spoke to her inaudibly for a moment longer, then left, seeming satisfied. 
(Williston TLC:7/23) 
 
Temp workers used these front counter tactics to curry favor from and advertise their 
presence to dispatchers.  
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 By virtue of the triangular employment relationship, tactics that sustained 
temporary workers by extending working hours also sustained the TLC.  Similarly, workers 
using front counter tactics demonstrated their competence in official TLC norms and 
signaled their intention to reproduce them. Cumulatively, these tactics had the effect of 
reproducing and strengthening the moral economy of temporary labor in the region. As the 
oil-boom ideology gave way to the new narrative of the bust, however, the basis for consent 
began to erode. However, this shift in narrative came slowly to the region, and especially to 
temporary workers, who preferred to believe their tactics would eventually lead to the 
fulfillment of their plans.  
 
DISCUSSION  
 For the first decade and a half of the 21st century, Williston, North Dakota was a 
rural place defined by urban problems—including managing the circulation of a reserve 
army of unskilled workers from urban areas. After years of shrinkage, small-town 
institutions18 were suddenly needed to mediate global economic pressures, and geographic 
and political scales took on hybrid forms. In this thesis, I demonstrated how the growth of 
one of these hybrids—the TLC—helped organize and manage a problematic commodity—
labor. I also demonstrated how the people who labored managed to live while being 
treated as a commodity.  
 If the mobility (in both the geographic and economic sense) of TLC workers 
demonstrates the “interscalar connectivity” (Peck 2002: 334) characteristic of 
contemporary social life, then the TLC might be considered a “mechanism[] of scale 
                                                 
18 TLC was part of a temporary labor chain that has sites around the U.S. Empirically, though, it was a small-
town institution—run by locals and defined by the particular moral economy that developed there.  
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transformation” (ibid.)—a site where the extra-local is managed, organized, and rendered 
proximal. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate, workers are not passive subjects of such a 
mechanism. It was their participation in this transformation—through manipulation, 
resistance, and, finally, consent—that helped (temporarily) transform Williston into 
“boomtown USA.”  
 Temporary work in rapid industrial change offers one vantage point to survey these 
transformations, but this perspective raised more questions than answers. More work 
should be done to trace the pathways of mobile workers to and from regions like the 
Bakken: where else have they lived and worked, and how do they use mobility (in both 
work arrangements and across space), along with other livelihoods practices, to survive 
flexible accumulation? The political ramifications of a mobile, precarious underclass are 
important to understand as the economy becomes more dependent on flexible 
accumulation19: do people living in RV Parks and other mobile housing arrangements 
participate in the political process? Do mobile workers who live in their vehicles have a 
right to privacy? Does geographic and vocational detachment threaten these workers’ de 
facto citizenship? These workers shared radical political and economic ideologies with me. 
Fleshing out the details of these beliefs could offer meaningful insights into American 
market fundamentalism: why do these workers resort to Fordist nostalgia instead of 
revolution? What accounts for their belief in the benevolence of market forces and the 
inherent corruption of government? 
 Political Ecology provided the analytical structure I used to go about this study, but I 
was unable to pay adequate attention to the “ecology” of temporary work on the Bakken 
                                                 
19 Katz and Krueger (2016) recently identified most of the employment growth of the last decade was in 
“alternative work arrangements,” i.e. temporary, contract, and contingent labor.  
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shale. While I was able to explore how these workers’ visions of landscape are tied to their 
sense of the significance of oil work, more research, using more diverse methods, should be 
done to explore how these images influence the way they treat the land they work on and 
in. Does their sense of permanence or transience change how they perceive the oil-boom 
landscape? How do these ways of perceiving landscape—and defining resources—relate to 
long-term residents’ perceptions? Finally, how does this sense of landscape relate to their 
perceptions of global environmental and political issues, such as climate change, terrorism, 
and migration?  
 While I believe the relationship between tactics and ideology is an important one, 
with these data I could only demonstrate some of the ways they reinforce each other. My 
aim, in part, was to show that the Habermasian notion of labor as a purely technical 
exercise is too simplistic. Labor, like any other human activity, is a dialogical process. Temp 
workers, for example, imagine their labor in ideological terms but deploy it tactically. In my 
fieldwork, I discovered that labor is subject to large-scale ideological structures, 
communicates ideas and values, is a way of relating to others, and can be a way to modify 
institutional practices.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The structure of temporary labor, and the moral economy that results, leaves 
workers open to define their approach to the labor process in terms of an ideology found 
outside the employment relationship. In this case, an oil boom ideology promising wealth 
and a significant role in the global political economy brought workers to the Bakken region. 
Workers without direct connections to the oil industry or the system of contractors 
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supporting it often resorted to the TLC to “keep their feet” until they could find better work 
in oil. Workers who, like Hunter, minimized effort on jobsites in an attempt to secure 
return tickets and maintain “flexibility” in case they had an opportunity to secure a 
“$10,000 a month job” effectively worked to increase surplus value for TLC. As oil prices 
declined throughout 2015, the temp workers that remained in Williston operated under 
the belief that oil jobs would return, though the temporary labor market was both 
shrinking and redistributing to infrastructure development (housing, roads, etc.). 
 Rather than helping these workers gain access to oil work, their participation in 
temporary labor usually resulted in an extension of their tenure as temporary workers or 
redistribution to less-temporary jobs outside the oil industry. The oil boom ideology 
obscured any "important information on the changing work demands in the labor market” 
(Benner 2003: 625) that the TLC inadvertently provided workers. Even laid-off oil workers 
worked for TLC for extended periods, ensuring their availability as commodities in the 
Bakken labor market despite increasingly adverse socioeconomic conditions. 
 
School of Hard Knocks 
 A large picture hung over the front desk at TLC. The picture showed, in faded colors, 
a white man in a hardhat leaning over a blueprint, a toolbelt hanging jauntily on his hips. A 
(uncited) John Dewey quote hung in the air above the man’s hardhat: “To find out what one 
is fitted to do, and to secure an opportunity to do it, is the key to success [sic].” The man 
stared pensively into the middle ground of the room he stood in, apparently contemplating 
the space he constructed with satisfaction.  
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 Without speculating on the intentions of the person who changed “happiness” in the 
original to “success” for the purposes of the TLC, the change in emphasis is appropriate. 
Temp workers at TLC willingly displaced “happiness” for “success” every day they signed in 
to be dispatched for work. In this revision of Democracy and Education, TLC highlighted its 
ideological function in these men’s lives20.  
 TLC (and its dispatchers) saw itself as these workers’ wise teacher, shepherding 
them from urban exclusion (e.g. imprisonment, or, nearly as ignominious, un- or under- 
employment) to the pastures of neoliberal economic development. This is what 
rehabilitation consists of in a post-welfare state, where democracy means economic 
participation and education means learning what it takes to get by.  
 “A right occupation,” Dewey goes on, “means simply that the aptitudes of a person 
are in adequate play, working with the minimum of friction and the maximum of 
satisfaction.” In fact, striving for happiness in Dewey’s sense of the term would have been 
laughable for temp workers. Neither occupations nor aptitudes were part of the 
arrangement at TLC. Instead, temp workers strove for access to work that paid well, 
seemed proud, and lasted longer than twelve hours. In the process, TLC secured their 
consent to precarity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 While temp workers were more subject to the “external ideology” of the oil boom, perhaps dispatchers, 
whose working relationships were sheltered within the TLC—were more prone to absorb TLC-specific 
ideology. 
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